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THEOLOGY OF THE EARLY STOA
ADAM DROZDEK
Muchos son los nombres de Dios en la teología
estoica, que refleja la suprema importancia de
Dios no sólo en la Teología, sino también en la Fí-
sica, e incluso en la Lógica. Esta suprema impor-
tancia es denotada por un vigoroso monoteísmo
que alcanza el nivel de panteísmo.
God is called by many names in the Stoic theo-
logy, which reflects the all-importance of God not
only in theology, but also in physics and even in
logic. This all-importance is indicated by strong
monotheism that reaches the level of pantheism.
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In the opening line of his hymn to Zeus, Cleanthes refers to Zeus as po-
luÓnumoj, the one of many names. Although it is a customary denomination
in hymns to the gods, the Stoics took this very seriously, and there is no
shortage of names given to God in the extant fragments and testimonies. For
example, “Zeno names logos the disposer of the things of nature and maker
of the universe. He calls it fate, necessity of things, God, and the mind (ani-
mus) of Zeus” (Lactantius, De uera sap. 9 = 1.160)1, and, in the words of
Diogenes Laertius, the Stoics say that “God and mind (nous), fate (hei-
marmene) and Zeus are one, but called by many different names” (DL 7.135
= 1.102). A theologically interesting problem is to what extent these names
reflect the Stoic conception of divinity and whether these names can be re-
conciled with one another as descriptions of the Stoic God. In this paper,
some of these names are scrutinized and connections between them are
established to arrive at the concept of God in the Stoic doctrine.
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1 Logos
Beginning with Zeno, the Stoics claimed that there are two principles –
passive and unqualified substance (oÐsía) or matter (Ølh), and active logos
or God – and four elements: fire, water, air, and earth (DL 7.134 = 1.85,
2.299). Both God and matter are eternal (Stobaeus 1.11.5a = 1.87). The re-
sult of the conjunction of God and matter is qualified matter. This conjunc-
tion has shape and occupies space. The two archai are never found in sepa-
ration from one another2. Matter is corporeal3, but at the same time without
form and attributes (DL 7.134 = 1.85), which is difficult to reconcile with its
corporeality. A true attribute of substrate is its passivity. Logos is an active
principle that gives matter form and motion4.
To account for multiplicity of things, the Stoics introduce logoi spermati-
koi. Individual beings develop according to the logoi spermatikoi, and parti-
cular events develop in an order of necessary succession (Aetius 1.7.33 =
2.1027). 
In the development of their system, the Stoics were influenced to a consi-
derable extent by the science of the day, in particular, by medicine and bio-
logy. The Stoics were also interested in logic, and their logical analyses, in
particular, Chrysippus’, mark an emergence of propositional logic. The pre-
sence of the two fields – science and logic – is reflected also in their termi-
nology and Heinze is correct in his observation that logos spermatikos is the
strongest link between the logical and biological aspects of their system5.
Observing regularities in nature – particularly in the inviolable sequences of
phases of developments of various organisms – and establishing rigid logi-
cal rules lead to a generalization of cosmic regularities that are individuali-
zed in plants, animals, and men. Harmony, and thus reasonableness of the
world, is found primarily in observed and established regularities, develop-
ments, and sequences of natural events. In this sense, attempts of equating
logoi spermatikoi with Platonic ideas, as done already by Proclus (In Parm.
5.135 = 2.717), are incorrect. Ideas are embodiments of essences of material
things. History and development is, in Plato’s philosophy, the responsibility
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of the Demiurge, who shapes the world, and of self-moving souls. The
Stoics do not really have a counterpart to Platonic ideas. There are no eter-
nal paragons according to which things develop, no model for the develop-
ment of, for example, a maple tree. Development of each plant begins with a
seed and this seed has already implanted in it all the stages of the plant’s
development. A sequence in which these stages unfold is the responsibility
of the logos spermatikos of this particular plant. To use a simile of a film
reel6, a seed is like a collection of frames of the film; the logos is the
sequence in which the frames are displayed. This sequence is predetermi-
ned, unshuttered, and necessary. The reel is there, from the outset, as one
entity whose two aspects are the seed and the logos: the logos spermatikos.
In this sense, it is true that the logos spermatikos “radically differs from a
logical, mathematical necessity which links essences, not events”7.
Logoi spermatikoi can be considered particular developmental laws cor-
responding to particular beings. They are encompassed by the cosmic logos,
active substance, God. The primary meaning of logos is reason, rationality,
whose primary manifestation in the world is not only order, harmony, infal-
libility of natural, but also historical, regularities. No one else but God can
be the author of this cosmic harmony and because, as Cleanthes stated, there
is nothing more divine than logos (ratio)8, God is reason. The essence of
God is his rationality.
2 Fire
According to Arius Didymus, Zeno stated that there are two kinds of fire:
“one is undesigning (ƒtexnon) and converting fuel into itself, the other is
designing (texnikón), causing growth and preservation” (Stobaeus 1.22.5 =
1.120). There is nothing extraordinary in Zeno’s view. Already Plato distin-
guished several kinds of fire (Tim. 58c). Theophrastus mentions two kinds
of fire (De igne 4). The problem of two kinds of fire is complicated by the
fact that, beginning with Zeno, the Stoics claimed that there are, as already
mentioned, two inseparable principles: matter and God, and four elements:
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fire, water, air, and earth (DL 7.134 = 1.85, 2.299). The world is created by
God by transforming ousia into the four elements (DL 7.136 = 1.102), that
is, “when ousia changes from fire” into the elements, including fire9. To
reconcile the existence of two principles, designing fire, and four elements,
including fire, it seems that designing fire should be seen as one of the two
principles, God10. This conclusion is reinforced by testimonies in which
precisely such identification was made by the Stoics themselves. For Zeno,
God is designing fire (Augustine, Adu. acad. 3.17.38 = 1.157), for the
Stoics, fire is God (Augustine, De ciu. Dei 8.5 = 2.423) and God is the de-
signing fire (Aetius 1.7.33 = 2.1027).
Fire has a prominent position in the doctrine of conflagration. “At certain
fated times the entire world is the subject of conflagration, and then is
reconstructed afresh; but the primary fire is as it were a sperm which posses-
ses the logoi of all things and the causes of past, present, and future events”,
says Aristocles (Eusebius, Praep. eu. 15.14.2 = 1.98). “The whole world is
dissolved into fire” (15.18.2) and is then reconstituted thanks to the store of
knowledge fire possesses; fire is like a seed from which everything develops
in the next cycle (Stobaeus 1.20.1e = 1.107). The only substance that exists
at conflagration is designing fire and this is the time when God has “the
whole substance,” that is, the whole of designing fire, as his hegemonikon;
when under the direction of God, the world again unfolds in the next cosmic
cycle, “God comes to be in a part of substance” (Origen, CC 4.14 = 2.1052).
That is, during conflagration, the whole of substance becomes God’s hege-
monikon; substance becomes endowed only with qualities required by divine
hegemonikon’s structure, that is, qualities which are necessary for God’s
proper functioning. This is the time when God can be identified with hege-
monikon. After conflagration, substance constituting God’s hegemonikon
becomes matter out of which the world is reconstructed and after the world
is regenerated, God the designing fire becomes only “a part of the subs-
tance,” immanent in the world, but not identical to it.
3 Pneuma
To Aristotle, the source of motion in the world was coming from the
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outside to the sublunar sphere: the unmoved mover caused a circular motion
of celestial spheres made out of aethereal substance, and this motion was
imparted onto the world of fire, water, air, and earth. But he also considered
an immanent force, “a principle and a cause of motion and rest of the thing
in which it resides” (Phys. 192b20). Strato denied the existence of a
transcendent divinity. To him, an ultimate cause of motion was immanent
and determined events through blind necessity11. The trend in the Lyceum
was to make the transcendent source of motion immanent in nature. Also,
the current biological and medical theories attributed life to warmth in the
body and breath, the carrier of this warmth. The current philosophical and
scientific theories influenced the Stoic view of the world pneuma. 
First, pneuma is self moving and is in constant motion12. It moves the
body (DL 7.157 = 1.135). In that, the Stoics are the heirs of Plato’s doctrine
of the source of motion.
Second, pneuma permeates the entire universe, as already stated by Cle-
anthes (Tertullian, Apol. 21 = 1.533) and confirmed by Chrysippus (Alexan-
der, De mixt. 216.14 = 2.473), and holds it and everything in it together13,
and thus pneuma is a cohesive force in the universe. Its peculiar property is
called tónoj, tension, which is “the stroke of fire,” sometimes called
strength and force (Plutarch, SR 1034d = 1.563), and thus pneuma is cha-
racterized by tensional motion (tonikÈ kínhsij, Nemesius 2.12 = 2.451). 
Third, as stated by Chrysippus, pneuma produces qualities in formless
and unmoving matter. Qualities that are pneumata and air-like tensions
produce forms and shapes (Plutarch, SR 1054a = 2.449). In this way, the
world pneuma can be considered the totality of pneumata in the cosmos.
The Stoics distinguish between two kinds of pneuma: psychikon pneuma
(Galen, De usu partium 3.496 = 2.781) that is drier and warmer than the
other kind (Galen, Def. med. 19.452 = 2.757, 787). The first kind is found in
animals as psyche and in men and the whole cosmos as nous. The other
kinds are physis and hexis. There are thus four kinds of beings in the
universe, depending on the form of pneuma present in them. In inanimate
objects, pneuma exists as hexis, in plants as physis, in animals as psyche,
and in rational beings as nous. All bodies are sustained by hexis, a portion of
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the universal pneuma, and so each body has its individual hexis, each hexis
being nothing else but (a current of) air. This sustaining hexis-air “is respon-
sible for the quality of each of the bodies which are bound together by hexis,
and they call this quality hardness in iron, density in stone, and whiteness in
silver” (Plutarch, SR 1053f = 2.449). This hexis, a function of pneuma that
individualizes bodies, is itself individualized in the body and exists in it in
the form of air and infuses the body with particular forms. But the forms
may evolve during the lifetime of the body. Where are the forms that will be
acquired by the body in the future? They may be considered to exist already
in the dormant and undeveloped form in the seed. The forms that are in this
store evolve according to logos spermatikos, the law of development. Howe-
ver, since logos spermatikos is a formula of development, it is actualized by
the force that stems from the pneuma, an air-like tension, specific to a parti-
cular body. The seed performs its function properly because pneuma uses its
resources to bring it to fruition according to logos spermatikos14.
Fourth, beginning with Chrysippus, pneuma is viewed as composed of air
and fire15, or the hot and the cold (Galen, De plac. 5.447 = 2.841), whereas
for Zeno, pneuma was one of the two archai that are distinguished from the
four elements produced by pneuma. Chrysippus retains only elements, and
pneuma is but a mixture of two active elements, air and fire. In this way
“Chrysippus arrived at the view more materialistic and from the perspective
of spiritualization of the pneuma he is clearly in regression in respect to his
immediate predecessors”16.
The world soul was mentioned in the Early Stoa. Zeno is said to have
claimed that matter “does not lack eternal spiritus and liveliness which will
turn it in a rational way” (Calcidius 292 = 1.88). This testimony is not very
reliable, and it does not square well with the rest of Zeno’s views17. It ap-
pears that Cleanthes was the first to mention the world pneuma18, although
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there are opinions that the concept of cosmic pneuma was introduced into
Stoic philosophy by Chrysippus19. Priority of Cleanthes in that respect is
strengthened by his priority in his introduction of tonos20. The importance of
pneuma, particularly world pneuma, lies in its tonos through which cohesion
of the world and of all individual being in it is assured. 
It is important to notice that the Stoics not only mention cosmic pneuma
but also cosmic psyche. For Cleanthes, God is the world psyche (Aetius
1.7.17 = 1.532). Chrysippus says that the world is a reasonable, animated
(œmyuxon), intelligent living being (DL 7.142 = 2.633), that is, it possesses a
psyche. He also explicitly mentions the cosmic psyche21. This expression is
the consequence of the view – in which the Stoics follow Aristotle – that
cosmos is alive. Being alive means being endowed with a soul, and as pos-
sessing a soul characterizes animals and humans, so it must also be a feature
of the cosmic animal, the cosmic living entity, the entire world. But just like
soul is a manifestation of the all-pervading pneuma, so is the world soul a
manifestation of world pneuma, or as already stated by Zeno, “psyche is
warm pneuma” (DL 7.157 = 1.136). This view allows the Stoics to switch
between the cosmic psyche and the cosmic pneuma. It is thus justified for
them to say that the human soul is an offshoot (‚póspasma) of the cosmos
as a living creature (DL 7.143 = 2.633) and a portion of the world psyche
that penetrates and animates everything that exists (Hermias, Irris. gentil.
philos. 14 = 1.495) because it means at the same time that the human soul is
part of the cosmic pneuma in one of its tensional forms, that pneuma is res-
ponsible for conditions of the soul and the status of the individual, and that
pneuma produces qualifications of individuals; thus man’s individuality can-
not be realized in any other place or time. The claim that the human soul is
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an offshoot of the cosmos is rendered in Roman Stoicism as a religious sta-
tement that human logos is a fragment of God identified as individual man22.
The harmony of the parts of the cosmos “could not happen as they do un-
less they were bound together by one divine and continuously connected
spiritus” (Cicero, ND 2.19), which can only be done if pneuma has a measu-
re of intelligence. And, in fact, the Stoics considered pneuma endowed with
divine reason (Lactantius, Div. inst. 1.5 = 2.1025). As mentioned, pneuma
always existed, but world soul is also indestructible (DL 7.156 = 2.774).
Thus pneuma’s eternity and intelligence by themselves point to its divine
status. We can find statements that the Stoics “made God … pneuma perva-
ding the whole world” (Aetius 1.7.33 = 2.1027) and that for them “God is
pneuma pervading everything and containing everything in itself” (Origen,
CC 6.71 = 2.1051). God is repeatedly equated in testimonies with pneuma.23
The Stoics defined the substance of God as “an intelligent and fiery pneuma
which does not have a shape but changes into whatever it wishes and assimi-
lates itself to all things” (Aetius 1.6.1 = 2.1009). Plato’s transcendent De-
miurge and world soul are folded by the Stoics into immanent God-pneuma,
an intelligent and eternal being that designs the order of the universe and
determines qualities of each individual entity in it. Pneuma is not just the
instrument of God24, it is God, although God blended with matter.
God is pneuma, and God is the active principle which suggests that
pneuma and the active principle should be identified. However, the active
principle is the same as designing fire, but pneuma is a composite of fire and
air where – because of the connection with air – undesigning fire is meant.
The two accounts can be reconciled by referring to a development of the
Stoic doctrine: Zeno’s two principles are abandoned by Chrysippus and only
his four elements are retained25. Chrysippus would agree with many of Ze-
no’s formulations, but he would interpret them differently. In particular,
both Zeno and Chrysippus would agree that the active principle is the same
as pneuma, but Chrysippus abolishes the two principles as entities separate
from the four elements and dissolves the former in the latter. In that, the
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active principle is at best a modus loquendi that refers to the pneuma which
is a mixture of air and fire (destructive fire, that is; creative fire would be
just its another name). God-pneuma is still an active principle for Chrysip-
pus, but God is not a body distinguished, as for Zeno, from the four ele-
ments, but rather a composite of two of the elements26.
Incidentally, it is worth noting that the Stoics mention both matter and
substance, which has a bearing on the problem of God. It is said that for
Zeno and Chrysippus “matter (silua) is that which underlies all those things
which have qualities; however, the first matter of all things or their primeval
foundation is substance (essentia) being in itself without qualities and
unformed” (Calcidius 290 = 1.86). This testimony is used as the base of the
inference that for the Stoics, first matter (prÓth Ølh) or first substance “has
two aspects, one of which is Ølh, one qeój”27.
There are plethora of testimonies that use words “matter” and “substan-
ce” interchangeably. For example, matter is called by Zeno and Chrysippus
substance and matter (DL 7.150 = 1.87, 2.316); Zeno states that first matter
is the substance of all things (Stobaeus 1.11.5a = 1.87) and unqualified subs-
tance is matter (DL 7.134 = 1.85). Sextus begins his reasoning at one place
in this way: “the substance of what exists” is motionless and since we see
“the matter of the universe moving, etc.” (SE 9.75 = 2.311), that is, substan-
ce is identified with matter. Also, “matter itself is substance” testifies Ploti-
nus (2.4.1 = 2.320). Also, Calcidius, whose testimony is used in favor of the
view that matter is an aspect of substance, uses in his exposition of Stoic
views the phrase “matter or substance” (Calcidius 293); essentia, he says,
“is the one common substrate (substantia) of everything” (Calcidius 292 =
1.88). He also elaborates on the afore-quoted view by saying that, for
example, gold is “matter of those things that are manufactured from them,”
but not their substance (Calcidius 290). Substance is what lies at the basis of
matter, whether it is gold or anything else. This example allows us to make a
terminological distinction between material which is the matter spoken of in
the last sentence and the matter which is substrate of all things. Material is a
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qualified manifestation of unqualified matter and is the result of the activity
of the active principle, God, on matter28. For Zeno then, God and substance
are different although inseparable entities; for Chrysippus, God-substance of
the conflagration period transforms part of substance, of itself, into material
and still permeates it, and thus for Chrysippus it is correct to say that a self-
crafting fire, God, uses itself as its own matter to generate the world29.
4 Aether
For Aristotle, aether was the fifth element, irreducible to the four ele-
ments; one reason being that the natural motion of aether is circular, whereas
the natural motion of the four elements is rectilinear30. Zeno, on the other
hand, is said to deny special status to aether (Cicero, De fin. IV 12 = 1.134).
The uppermost part of the heavens is defined by Zeno as a±qéroj tò œs-
xaton (Achilles Tatius, Isag. 5 = 1.115) which may mean that the heavens
are the extremity (of the universe) made out of aether (material genitive) or
the extremity of aether (partitive genitive). The latter interpretation implies
that aether is also in other parts of the universe, whereas the former does not
exclude this possibility, but does not stress it. The material make-up of the
heavens is confirmed in the testimony that the uppermost sphere of the
universe is fire, called aether, which is filled with fixed stars (DL 7.137 =
2.580). Also, Cleanthes discusses “the furthest and highest and outermost,
everywhere surrounding everything and encircling [it] and embracing heat
which he calls aether” (Cicero, ND I 37 = 1.534). To Chrysippus, aether is
rarified fire (Plutarch, SR 1053a = 2.579), the purest and greatly rarified part
of the cosmos (Stobaeus 1.21.5 = 2.527). The world’s hegemonikon is the
heavens, says Chrysippus (and Posidonius), who also states that “the purest
part of the aether, … the first God,” permeates the universe (DL 7.139).
That is, aether is not limited to the heavens, but it is purest in the heavens,
and it can be found in all parts of the universe mixed with other elements.
These testimonies make it clear that, to the Stoics, aether was fire in the
purest form which is to be found on the boundaries of the world; the space
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filled with aether-fire is the repository of fixed stars. Also, in the words of
Arius Didimus, pneuma is analogous to aether and both words are used
synonymously (Stobaeus 1.17.4 = 2.471). However, because pneuma (since
Chrysippus) is a mixture of fire and air, this synonymy cannot be pressed
too far. Most importantly from a theological perspective, Zeno, Cleanthes,
and Chrysippus call aether God31 and the Stoics in general considered aether
to be the principle of all (Minucius Felix, Oct. 19.10 = 1.154).
Aether does not play any particular role in the Stoic system. It seems that
the only reason that aether appears in the discussions of the Stoics is that it
was a current term of the time and the Stoics wanted to show a connection
between their system and other systems, particularly peripatetic physics. By
referring to aether and its undistinguished character in respect to the two
principles and the four elements, the Stoics stressed the uniformity of the
world. By reducing aether to fire, they abolished the division between supra-
and sublunar spheres: the world is one, all laws of nature are found in all
parts of the world. Furthermore, because God is aether-fire, and fiery pneu-
ma permeates the entire universe, the world is a physico-theological unity,
the same world for the living and the dead, because there is no ontologically
special place for the departed souls. They exist in the same physical world
as the living who are able to communicate with them because the nature of
the dead does not change, they are just as physical beings as the living.
5 Fate
An important concept in the Stoic system is the concept of fate, or destiny
(e¶marménh). Zeno defines fate as “the chainlike cause of existing things of
the logos according to which they are ordered” (DL 7.149 = 1.175) and as
“the moving power of matter in the same way, which does not differ from
providence and nature” (Aetius 1.27.5 = 1.176). Generally, for the Stoics,
fate is “a sequence of causes, that is, an inescapable ordering and connec-
tion” (Aetius 1.28.4 = 2.917) and “a certain natural order of all things follo-
wing closely upon one another and moved in succession from eternity, and
their interconnection is unalterable” (Gellius VII 2.3 = 2.1000). There is no
chance, no randomness in the world, all order of events is determined by an
all-embracing system of causal chains. Fate is ubiquitous, fate affects every-
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32 Plutarch, SR 1056b = 2.997; Cicero, De div. 1.125-127 = 2.921, 944.
33 This identification leads Duprat to the statement that “supreme God has himself no
will: he is only reason,” G.L. Duprat, «La doctrine stoïcienne du monde, du destin et de la
providence d’après Chrysippe», Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 23, 1910, p. 492, but
we can easily claim that God wills to follow the dictates of universal logos, his own logos,
follow himself and the laws he himself institutes according to his will. As Seneca phrased it,
God “having once given a command, he always obeys” (De prov. 5.8). Cf. J. Mansfeld,
«Providence and the destruction of the universe in Early Stoic thought», in M.J. Vermaseren
(ed.) Studies in Hellenistic religions, Leiden, 1979, p. 161.
34 Alexander, De fato 22 = 2.945, 31 = 2.928.
35 Stobaeus 1.5.15 = 2.913; Lactantius, De vera sap. 9 = 1.160; Plutarch, SR 1050c,
1056c = 2.937.
36 A.A. Long, «Freedom and determinism in the Stoic theory of human action», in A.A.
Long (ed.), Problems in Stoicism, London, 1971, p. 178.
thing (DL 7.149 = 1.175) and all things happen according to fate32. There is
no room for uncaused cause, as allowed through the concept of swerving in
the Epicurean system. This, to be sure, raises the problem of freedom in a
rigidly determined world. The Stoics addressed this problem by making a
distinction between fate and providence (prónoia), that is, God’s will. We
only know that Cleanthes did not identify fate and providence (Calcidius 144
= 2.933) and this is also reflected in his hymn to Zeus in which the evil “in
their folly” attempt to break with the divine law (vv. 15-17). However, for
Chrysippus, providence is the same as fate (Calcidius 144)33.
In the context of theology, it is important that, for Chrysippus, God is fa-
te (Cicero, ND 1.39 = 2.1077) and “nothing takes place or moves at the least
differently than according to the logos of Zeus, which he [Chrysippus] says
is the same as fate” (Plutarch, SR 1056c = 2.997). In general, the Stoics are
said to state that God is fate and fate is God who “is present in all existing
things”34.
These theological statements square well with other definitions of fate.
“Fate is the logos of the cosmos”; “the logos of the things organized by provi-
dence in the cosmos”; “logos according to which the things which happened,
happened, the things which are happening, are happening, and the things
which will happen, will happen” (Stobaeus 1.5.15 = 2.913). Moreover, fate
and logos of the world are interchangeable terms35. In this identification, pro-
bably logos spermatikos, the principle of growth, is meant36: “God contains
‘seminal principles’ according to which each thing comes about by fate”
(Aetius 1.7.33 = 2.1027). Also, Chrysippus calls “the substance of fate a
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power of pneuma” (Stobaeus 1.5.15 = 2.913) that is in “eternal motion, conti-
nuous and ordered” (Theodoretus 6.14 = 2.916). And because pneuma is the
source of motion, so fate is pneuma. Because pneuma and logos are consi-
dered divine, it naturally follows that fate and pneuma and logos are seen as
the same.
6 Nous
Nous, the Stoics are reported to say, is a part of psyche that manifests
itself in rational beings (logikoi) only (Stobaeus 1.49.24 = 1.377). As alrea-
dy mentioned, pneuma manifests itself in the world as hexis, physis, psyche,
and nous. Psyche is a form of pneuma found in animals and nous in humans
and gods. Because the latter are higher beings than animals, nous can be
considered a development of a form of psyche or – as the testimony just
quoted suggests – nous is a part of psyche; by extending this reasoning, we
may state that psyche is part of a particular being’s physis and the latter a
part of the being’s hexis. All of them are ultimately manifestations of the all-
pervading pneuma. Because God is said to be pneuma, it is not surprising to
encounter Zeno’s statement that nous is God (Epiphanius, Adv. haer. 3.2.9 =
1.146). Because God is also said to be fire and aether, it is only natural for
Zeno to say that God is the fiery nous of the world37 and for the Stoics to
claim that the nous in aether38 is God (Aetius 1.7.33 = 1.1027). Because the
world as a whole is rational, as permeated by the divine logos, Chrysippus
can say that the world is guided through nous and providence because nous
permeates every part of the world (DL 7.138 = 2.634). But God-nous-pneu-
ma endows particular beings with their particular characteristics, which
leads to Zeno’s pronouncement that God constantly moves through the subs-
tance and in one place he is nous, in another psyche, in another physis, and
in yet another hexis (Themistius, De anima 72b = 1.158).
7 World
The world is a living and rational being and its rationality is due to the
cosmic logos-pneuma, the world soul, pervading it. The saturation level of
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39 Cicero, ND 1.37 = 1.530 (Cleanthes); DL 7.137 = 2.526; Stobaeus 1.21.5 = 2.527
(Chrysippus).
40 The fact of divine omnipresence is poetically expressed by Aratus in the opening
verses of his Phaenomena: “all ways are full of Zeus, and all human gathering places and full
[of him] are seas and havens,” which harks back to Thales’ “everything is full of the gods.”
41 DL 7.148 = 1.163. It is suggested that Diogenes inadvertently changed À kósmoj
oÐsía qeoû šstín, “the world is (made out of) substance of God”, to oÐsía qeoû À Áloj
kósmoj kaì À oÐranòj (šstín), Eduard Wellmann, Die Philosophie des Stoikers Zenon,
Leipzig, 1873, p. 37, cf. Pearson, op. cit., p. 121. This would, however, require not only
changing the word order but also adding some of them; moreover, Diogenes also finds this
statement in Chrysippus and Posidonius and it is difficult to assume that he misreads the
statement the same way every time.
42 SE 9.95 = 2.1015; Cicero, ND 2.39 = 2.641.
43 Verbeke, op. cit., p. 57.
the world with logos is not the same in all its parts and logos is concentrated
to the maximum degree in the cosmic hegemonikon which is, according to
Zeno and Chrysippus, the aethereal sphere of the fixed stars, and the sun, ac-
cording to Cleanthes (DL 7.138-139 = 2.644). This rational, living world the
Stoics considered to be God39: “The whole world along with all its parts they
call God” (Eusebius, Praep. ev. 15.15 = 2.528). Also, Zeno calls the world “a
beautiful animal and God” (Calcidius 292 = 1.88). The conclusion of the
Stoic pantheism seems to be inescapable. On the other hand, as already indi-
cated, Zeno distinguished between two principles, one of them being God.
Also, as Zeno and Chrysippus say, God is “the principle of all things, the pu-
rest body, and his providence pervades all things” (Hippolytus, Haer. 1.21 =
1.153)40. Zeno separated matter from God and saw God as going through
matter like honey through the honeycomb (Tertullian, Ad nat. 2.4 = 1.155).
He made matter equal to God (Tertullian, De praescr. haer. 7 = 1.156) and
said that “the substance of God is the whole world and the heaven”41. Cos-
mos, say the Stoics, is rational (nerój, sapiens) and as such it is God42.
If the world is understood as an organization of the stars, then it is possi-
ble that in the pronouncements that the world is God, only astral world is
meant, the world of fixed stars43. This is the world’s hegemonikon, and as
such, the rational and thus most divine part of the entire universe. However,
cosmos is also understood as the whole world – the whole of passive matter
organized by active logos (DL 7.137-138). As man is his body and soul, at
least during his terrestrial peregrinations, so is cosmos one beautiful animal,
one entity, one God. This understanding is not only admissible, but inevi-
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46 Simon mentions three concepts of God: transcendent God who guides the world, God
who pervades the world, and mythical gods, Marie Simon, «Zum Problem der stoischen
Theologie», in J. Irmscher, W. Steffen (eds.) Philologische Vorträge, Wroc³aw, 1959, p. 72.
However, there is no transcendent God in the Stoics, so the first concept may only mean God
the cosmos.
47 Heinze, op. cit., p. 105; an attempt to weaken the Stoic pantheism is the statement that
“in so far as God is manifested in the world, the world is God,” Pearson, op. cit., p. 121,
which is not altogether convincing. “The identification of God with the world was a central
tenet of Stoicism, a postulate of the Stoic vitalism and in concert with the principles of Stoic
physics,” Myrto Dragona-Monachou, The Stoic arguments for the existence and the
providence of the gods, Athens, 1976, p. 69.
48 Verbeke, op. cit., p. 38.
table because to the Stoics, the world is perfect in every respect (Cicero, ND
2.37-39,86-87). Cosmos is not only alive, but also rational and as such the
most perfect being44. If the world is perfect and God is only one – although
indispensable – part of it, so God by himself is not perfect, not, at least, to
the extent that the world is. But there cannot be anything more perfect than
God. In fact, Cleanthes offers a proof of God’s existence from degrees of
perfection. There are different levels of perfection, and thus there must be
something most perfect since an infinite sequence of perfect beings is im-
possible, and beings in the world cannot be perfected indefinitely. Among
these beings, as man surpasses other beings with respect to beauty and intel-
ligence, there must be a god who surpasses man, so God (“an animal that is
best and most excellent”) exists45. A Stoic philosopher is thus forced to ac-
cept pantheism, having accepted that there is the most perfect God imma-
nent in the most perfect world.
The Stoics thus vacillated between (at last) two concepts of God: God is
the entire cosmos, or only its rational part: logos-pneuma46. If the first mea-
ning is stressed, then one cannot seriously doubt the pantheism of the
Stoics47. If the second meaning is emphasized – the duality of the active and
the passive principles – we have what can be termed panentheism: “every-
thing is in God and God penetrates all things”48. But even if only the second
meaning is retained, the Stoic system can still be considered pantheistic, at
least Chrysippus’ version. For Zeno and Cleanthes, at the time of conflagra-
tion, the world dissolves into matter. There exists only God and matter. For
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pantheism in Chrysippus, and Verbeke, op. cit., p. 88 writes about Chrysippus’ semi-
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50 Cicero, De fin. 3.67 = 3.371; Eusebius, Praep. ev. 15.15.3-5 = 2.528; Origen, CC
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51 Alexander, De fato 37 = 3.247; Seneca, Ep. 31.9,11 = 3.200a.
52 SE 9.61-62, 133; Cicero, ND 2.5-6, 12-13. On the argument of universal consent, see
Dragona-Monachou, op. cit., pp. 44-46.
Chrysippus, there exists only God-designing fire. At that time the whole of
reality is God, and the world is recreated from God himself49.
Whether understood pantheistically or panentheistically, God is responsi-
ble for everything that is, for all events, for the entire history of the world.
God is not only pneuma-aether-designing fire, but also fate and providence.
God not only knows what is happening in the world, but he also wills it to
happen, unless it is assumed that he can act against himself. The same God
can be found in all parts of the world. One consequence of this monistic
outlook is the Stoic idea of universalism – every person is part of the same
logos, including slaves; cosmopolitanism – everyone is a citizen of the same
world; and the world-polis – the world is a home of men and gods50, which
is strongly pronounced in Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius, a former slave and
an emperor. Equalizing gods and men is the pinnacle of the Stoic social
ethics. By participating in the same logos, men are like gods51.
Another consequence of this pantheism is strong monotheism. The gods
are repeatedly mentioned by the Stoics, but they are clearly subsidiary
beings in respect to God. The Stoics did not entirely reject the gods of popu-
lar religion and even used the fact of universal agreement52 and the fact of
building altars (Themistius, In Anal. post. 79.1 = 2.1019) in the proof of
their existence. However, the gods are God’s creations that, unlike the gods
of mythology, are not immortal: they are destroyed in the cosmic conflagra-
tion and recreated in each cosmic cycle of palingenesis. Immortality, the one
attribute of divinity, characterizes “Zeus, who alone of the gods is imperish-
able” (Plutarch, CC 1077e = 2.1064). However, their acceptance of the gods
was at best done halfheartedly. Not to compromise their monotheism, they
attempted to explain – even explain away – their existence by, primarily,
treating them allegorically. The gods of popular religion were simply unac-
ceptable: jealous, squabbling, vindictive Olympian gods are just fables of
the poets, a subject of superstition and “idiotic beliefs,” and “utterly unpro-
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55 Wellmann, op. cit., p. 55; Stoic explanations are sometimes “farfetched word explana-
tions that often touch upon the ridiculous,” Simon, op. cit., p. 74, and their “arbitrariness and
puerility seem to us barely tolerable,” Gernet, Boulanger, op. cit., p. 409.
56 The difference between Cleanthes’ belief that all souls survive until conflagration,
and Chrysippus’ conviction that only the souls of the wise are capable of such survival (be-
cause they are stronger, DL 7.157 = 1.522, Aetius 4.7.3 = 2.810) is, eschatologically, minor.
57 René Hoven, Stoïcism et stoïciens face au problème de l’au-delà, Paris, 1971, p. 84.
fitable and frivolous” (Cicero, ND II 63, 70). Zeno dismissed them by saying
that Juno (Hera) was air, Jove (Zeus) the heavens, Neptune (Poseidon) the
sea, Vulcan (Hephaestus) fire53; that is, the gods are names of different ma-
nifestations of the one God54. One way of explaining the gods was by refe-
rence to etymology. “With extraordinary patience … Zeno, and even more
his followers, wasted their sagacity” to explain the names of the gods with
“hair-raising etymology”55. However, they were not at all original in this
approach since it was conducted very much in the spirit of Plato’s Cratylus.
If the gods are mortal so also are humans or rather their souls after death.
Immortality of the soul is abolished in the Stoic eschatology. Souls after
death can at best survive until conflagration56, during which, as everything
else, they are dissolved. Therefore, punishment after death is illusory: true
justice is fully realized on earth57.
The idea of God-cosmos leads directly to the Stoic ethical doctrine.
8 Nature
Zeno stated that the goal of life, telos, is “to live in agreement,” that is,
“with a single and harmonious logos”. A longer formula, “living in harmony
with nature”, was developed later because Zeno’s formula was considered
incomplete (Stobaeus 2.7.6a = 1.179). Chrysippus explains that telos is “li-
ving according to experience in those things that happen naturally” (DL 7.87
= 1.552), and according to the Stoics, telos means “to live in the continuous
use of exact knowledge of those things that happen naturally” (Cicero, De
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58 Edwyn Bevan, Stoics and Sceptics, Oxford, 1913, p. 55.
59 Gilbert Murray summarizes the Stoic approach by saying that they did not just want to
reestablish a traditional code of morals, they wanted to “find a new basic conduct in absolute
‘reason’,” in conversation with Bevan, op. cit., p. 52, note 1.
60 Gordon H. Clark, Selections from Hellenistic philosophy, New York, 1940, p. 59.
fin. IV 14 = 3.13). The concept of nature is critical in these definitions.
What is nature?
Zeno says that nature is the designing fire advancing on its path toward
generation (Cicero, ND II 57 = 1.171); the same is stated by all the Stoics
(DL 7.156 = 2.774). When we read that according to the Stoics “all things are
subject to nature” which “has a share in reason and order” (Cicero, ND II 81),
we see, basically, the same definition: nature is designing fire whose essence
is rationality, logos. Nature is thus the orderly side of the universe, and this
orderly side can only be God-logos. Therefore, after Seneca we can pose a
rhetorical question, “What else is nature than what God and divine ratio pre-
sent in all the world and all its parts?” (Seneca, De benef. IV 7.1 = 2.1024).
Living according to nature means avoiding what the sound logos prohi-
bits, the logos that permeates everything and is the same as Zeus (DL 7.87-
88); it is living “in harmony with God’s will”58. Each action is according to
a divine plan, and as such it is good; an individual can have peace of mind
only when his will is in harmony with the divine will.
The Stoics thus begin with the delineation of the structure of the world,
with physics, but in their monistic system, theology is the reverse side of
physics. Analysis of pneuma is the analysis of the physical side of the same
entity that metaphysics analyzes as an active principle, logic – as logos, and
theology – as God. These branches of knowledge are analyzing rational
God-pneuma for a very practical reason, to know how to live. As Chrysip-
pus stated, “there is no other or more appropriate way to approach the logos
of good and bad things or the virtues or happiness than from common nature
and from the administration of the world” (Plutarch, SR 1035c = 3.68)59.
This physico-theological unity found in the Stoic God as expressed by
the Stoic pantheism has as a natural consequence what can be called pan-
theistic determinism.60 On the one hand, this determinism gives a scientific
justification for divination and an ethical justification for living according to
nature, but, on the other hand, it poses insurmountable problems to the idea
of freedom and the existence of evil. 
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conflagration is that all moisture is used up and only fire remains (Cicero, ND 2.118 = 2.593).
62 Margaret E. Reesor, The nature of man in Early Stoic philosophy, London, 1989, p.
Can there be any freedom in the world in which God is fate? This was a
troublesome problem for the Stoics, and they never solved it satisfactorily. It
was expressed in Zeno’s and Chrysippus’ metaphor of a dog tied to a cart: the
dog may willingly follow the cart, but if it does not want to, it will be dragged
by the cart anyhow (Hippolytus, Haer. 1.21 = 2.975). Cleanthes expresses
this sentiment in his prayer to Zeus (Epictetus, Ench. 53 = 1.527): 
Lead me, Zeus and destiny,
wherever is your will that I go
since I will follow unhesitatingly; when I don’t want to,
having become evil, I will follow, docile, anyway.
This raises a serious, practical problem of responsibility and punishment
for one’s actions. If everything is preordained, is it just to mete out punish-
ment? To a slave who was about to be flogged for stealing and who said, “it
was fated for me to steal,” Zeno replied, “and to be flogged” (DL 7.23 =
1.298). Although the answer may appear to be tongue in cheek, it is consis-
tent with the Stoic doctrine. When Chrysippus was asked whether one should
call a doctor if it is fated to get well or remain sick, he answered that both
calling the doctor and healing are co-fated (Cicero, De fato 30 = 2.956).
This strict determinism is more apparent if we also consider the problem
of conflagration. As already mentioned, the world is a subject of total des-
truction in fire and subsequent rebirth. Conflagration is justified by the need
of the cosmic catharsis: after conflagration there is only God, who is all good-
ness, “no evil at all remains, but the whole is then prudent and wise”61. After-
wards, everything is restored to the same state, so, for example, “there will be
again Socrates and Plato and each of the people along with the same friends
and citizens; they will do and pursue the same things and every city and cor-
ner and hamlet and field will be reestablished the same way” (Nemesius 38 =
2.625). After conflagration, “all things exist again in the world numerically,
and thus each individual, the same as in the preceding world, exists again in
this world,” according to Chrysippus (Alexander, In Anal. pr. 180.33-36 =
2.624). Even if the claim is interpreted as stating that in the renewed world
each individual will not be literally the same, but “a new individual with the
same characteristics and experiences”62, very strong determinism still stands.
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9. Some Stoics admitted some “small difference … between the facts of one period and the
preceding phase” (Origen, CC 5.20 = 2.626), but it seems that such a claim is “explicitly
revisionary” and a strong determinism is the original Stoic statement, A.A. Long, D.N.
Sedley, The Hellenistic philosophers, 1987, v. 1, p. 312. If we also agree with the statement
that “it was for the faith in Providence above all else that the Stoic stood in the ancient
world,” Bevan, op. cit., p. 44, then we see that strict determinism is the result of the nature of
God and of his will that it should be so.
63 Bréhier, op. cit., p. 146.
64 Wilhelm Capelle, Zur antiken Theodicee, Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 20
(1907), p. 188.
65 It is clear that God is omniscient because only God can “see with his mind the
connection of all causes,” and thus God “necessarily grasps all that will be,” as says Quintus
Cicero in defense of the Stoic theory of divination, Cicero, De div. I 127 = 2.944.
And this cannot be any other way: because, as mentioned, the world is per-
fect in every respect, the same world has to be recreated each time if this
world should remain perfect. Although man is imperfect and may strive for
improvement, the world as a whole is created perfectly all at once; it does
not evolve63.
This pantheistic determinism also poses the problem of explaining the
existence of evil. Where everything is derived from universal, perfect logos,
there should be no room for evil. And if there is, no man is responsible for
it, but God himself. There were some attempts to explain this situation. Evil
was explained as a means of promoting good. In the Malthusian spirit, Chry-
sippus said that wars are the means of avoiding overpopulation (Plutarch, SR
1049a = 2.1177), and predators exist for men to exercise their valiance
(Cicero, ND 2.161). Also, evil is indispensable for good to be recognizable
(Gellius 7.1.1-13 = 2.1169, 1170). It is not entirely unjustified to say that in
explaining evil Chrysippus was sometimes exercising “childish rationa-
lism”64. It was much more honest of Cleanthes to simply state in his hymn to
Zeus that everything in the world happens according to the cosmic logos,
except the deeds of evil (vv. 15-17). God can turn evil into good after it
happens, but he is not willing that to happen. God’s omniscience65 can be
reconciled with the independence of the evil, but how to reconcile it with
God’s fate, with God’s guiding the course of all things (vv. 10-12), Clean-
thes does not explain.
In their theology, the Stoics wanted to restore the position of God in the
universe. For Plato, the Demiurge molds the universe from preexisting mat-
ter using eternal ideas as models, and then leaves the maintenance of the
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universe to the divine stars and the world soul. The status of God decreases
significantly in peripatetic philosophy. Aristotle’s God is not interested in
the world; God does not even know the world exists because such a know-
ledge would undermine divine perfection. The only role God is playing is to
serve as a prime mover to the first heaven and consequently to the entire
world. Because of this limited role of God, it is not surprising to see cri-
ticism concerning the need of God in the peripatetic universe. Importantly,
the criticism stemmed from the ranks of the Lyceum itself. Theophrastus,
Aristotle’s successor, attempted to restore the role of God in the universe,
but Strato rejected any God by explaining naturalistically all physical phe-
nomena. He did not find any use of a transcendent God to deal with the pro-
blem of motion. At the same time, a Democritean philosophy, renewed by
Epicurus, proposed at best a deistic solution in its theology: the gods live in
the realm far away from the earth, not troubled by human affairs. This was
unsatisfactory to the Stoics who saw God as clearly interested in human af-
fairs, not as a being detached from the world. In their restoration of theolo-
gy, they took the current developments of science into account and proposed
a scientistic solution: God is what science says is the source of life, pneuma,
and whose intelligence, logos, is the best embodiment of the laws of logic.
God is the best that science can envision – perfect in execution of physical
and logical laws – but nothing more; that is, God’s transcendence is abolish-
ed in the spirit of their times. God is now interested in human affairs because
all the facets of these affairs, and of the entire universe, for that matter, are
permeated by God. God is these affairs. He not only is to be found in
everything, but he also is everything, Deus siue natura in the most extreme
form. God is ubiquitous and omniscient, and thus nothing can escape the
divine attention. But, as mentioned, this leads to the problem of freedom and
evil, the problem the Early Stoics never solved successfully. To their credit,
this is one of the most difficult theological and philosophical problems and
centuries long attempts in grappling with the problem of freedom vs.
predestination is ample evidence of its complexity – and importance.
